码头重复建设博弈分析  

作　　者：王伟 

机构地区：[1]河海大学应用经济研究所,南京市河海大学356信箱210098

出　　处：《港口装卸》2004年第1期3-5,共3页Port Operation

摘　　要：通过建立 2个码头之间的完全信息静态博弈模型和完全信息动态博弈模型 ,分析港口码头的重复建设现象。认为重复建设的根本原因在于各个港口对经济腹地的预测值偏高 ,港口之间缺乏协调合作 ,以致于在竞争中产生一种类似“囚徒困境”的心理。Applying two game models to analyze the repeating construction of two ports, one is the static game model for complete information and the other is the dynamic game model for complete information. The basic cause of the phenomena of repeating construction lies in that both of the port cannot calculate the area of the hinterland accurately and they are lack of cooperation. Thus, two ports fall into the prisoners' dilemma. Based on this discovery, some advice has been given to resolve this problem.

关 键 词：码头 重复建设 博弈分析 港口经济 资源浪费 恶性竞争 完全信息 静态博弈 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F552[经济管理—产业经济]