剩余索取权对银行代理人激励机制的博弈研究  

Incentive Mechanism for Bank Agent Using Claim to Residue

作　　者：蒲勇健[1] 宋军[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《金融研究》2004年第1期78-86,共9页Journal of Financial Research

摘　　要：如何有效激励银行代理人为委托人利益努力工作,是理论层面和操作层面均急需解决的重要而紧迫的问题。本文运用博弈论分析方法,分别研究了当期剩余索取权激励机制、当期和长期剩余索取权相结合的激励机制,论证了当前股份制银行普遍实行的当期剩余索取权激励机制存在很大缺陷,给银行委托人的利益带来很大负面影响,还不如支付给代理人一个固定报酬。最后,设计两种科学的激励机制,即经济增加值和部分资产所有权安排。It is urgent and crucial to establish effective incentive mechanism to promote bank agents working hardly for principal's benefits. The paper studies incentive mechanism by using claim to current period residue and claim to current and future residues. The conclusion is that incentive mechanism with claim to current residue has fatal deficiencies and negative effect on bank's principal interests. Finally the paper designs two sound incentive mechanisms, including economy added value and partly assets ownership arrangement.

关 键 词：剩余索取权 代理人 激励 博弈 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]