经理股票期权的经济学根源探析  

Discussion on the Economics Background of Executive Stock Option

作　　者：翟庆国[1] 杨玉文[2] 李剑[1] 曹玉梅[3] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁石油化工大学经济管理学院,辽宁抚顺113001 [2]大连民族学院经济管理系,辽宁大连116600 [3]河南石油勘探局五一社区劳资科河南南阳,473000

出　　处：《辽宁石油化工大学学报》2004年第1期85-87,共3页Journal of Liaoning Petrochemical University

摘　　要：　经理股票期权的盛行有其经济学根源。首先,现代企业是人力资本与非人力资本的一个特别的契约,人力资本的所有者有权分享企业剩余,经理股票期权激励机制突出了人力资本的价值。其次,所有权与经营权分离后,企业不可避免的面对由于信息不对称导致的委托-代理问题,经理股票期权给予经理人分享企业剩余的权利,从而将委托人的利益与代理人的利益联系起来,很好地解决了委托-代理矛盾。通过这两个方面的论述,阐明了经理股票期权激励机制产生的理论基础,为理解经理股票期权的涵义及在中国实际的运用作了必要的铺垫。The theoretical background of executive stock option (ESO) is economics. First, modern enterprises are an integration of human capital and non-human capital. Human capital has the right to participate in the allocation of the residual of a firm. Second, with the separation of ownership and management, the principal agent problems exist. Because of the asymmetry of information, it becomes difficult for the owners to monitor the activities of managers. With ESO, the managers become residual claimers of the firm. The owners and the managers become to have common interest. In this paper, a depth discussion of the economic background of ESO is described. The understanding of the economic background of ESO is essential for the design of ESO in Chinese enterprises.

关 键 词：经理股票期权 经济学 激励制度 人力资本 委托-代理 

分 类 号：F244[经济管理—劳动经济]