财务杠杆、信号博弈与信用风险识别  

Financial Leverage, Signaling Game and Credit Risk Recognition

作　　者：杨军[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国建设银行人力资源部,北京100032

出　　处：《金融研究》2004年第2期71-78,共8页Journal of Financial Research

摘　　要：本文分析论证了完全信息条件下财务杠杆作为信用风险识别信号的机理,并运用博弈论研究了不完全信息条件下财务杠杆作为信号的博弈问题,证明了精炼贝叶斯均衡解的条件。研究表明由于信息不对称,国内企业粉饰财务报表的成本较低,很难存在分离均衡和混同均衡,财务杠杆的风险识别作用降低。The paper proves that financial leverage is one of the signals recognizing the credit risk under complete infonnation. The signaling game model of the financial leverage is investigated under the incomplete information. It is demonstrated that there is no separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium because the enterprise' s financial reports has been decorated and the recognizing function of the credit risk is being weakened because of the asymmetric information.

关 键 词：财务杠杆 信号博弈 信用风险识别 分离均衡 混同均衡 企业 银行 精炼贝叶斯均衡 

分 类 号：F203[经济管理—国民经济]