内幕交易监管体系构建的法经济学分析  

Analysis on the Construction of Monitoring System for Inside Trading by Legal Economics

作　　者：张邦辉[1] 陆渝梅[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学贸易与行政学院,重庆400030 [2]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2004年第2期93-97,共5页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要："卡尔多 希克斯"效率和"规范霍布斯 科斯定理"框架下的法经济学分析表明:由于证券市场的特殊性和政府监管目标的双重性,内幕交易的行政监管往往处于事实无效的境地,而刑事监管则存在起点过高的问题;相对而言,私权救济是较为有效的内幕交易监管方式。但我国内幕交易私权救济制度的构建存在五个方面的基本障碍,本文在比较借鉴世界各国及地区已有立法经验的基础上,对这些障碍提出了具体的解决对策。The legal economics analysis under the frame of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and normative Hobos-Coarse theorem indicates that the administrative monitoring on inside trading is inefficient in reality because of the particularity of securities business and the double object of government monitoring, and the criminal monitoring has a problem that its jumping-off point is too high. Relatively speaking, relieving system from private law has a better effect on the inside trading monitoring, but the construction of it in China is faced by five basic obstacle, this paper carries a material analysis on them and puts forward some pertinent suggestions based on the comparison and reference on known legislation experience all of the other countries or regions.

关 键 词：内幕交易 监管体系 法经济学 

分 类 号：D922.29[政治法律—经济法学]