董事的信托义务研究——从制度协调的视角调控董事行为的一种尝试  

Study on the Fiduciary Duty of Directors ——An Exploration in the Perspective of Regulating the Directors' Behavior by Institutional Coordination

作　　者：徐卫东[1] 祝杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学法学院,吉林长春130012

出　　处：《吉林大学社会科学学报》2004年第2期117-123,共7页Jilin University Journal Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：董事与公司的关系并不是一种单一的关系。在功能论的视角下,董事与公司存在着各种不同的法律关系,董事的行为亦因此而受到不同法律的多重和全面的调控。董事的信托义务就是在董事与公司的信托关系下的通过信托法调整的结果。通过对董事的信托义务的研究,我们可以细化和深入董事的注意义务与忠实义务,从而使董事行为的法律调控问题在立法和司法上得以更好地解决。The relationship between directors and corporation cannot be generalized into only one kind. From the functional perspective, there are many different legal relations between directors and corporation and the actions of directors are thus under many-fold and comprehensive regulation of various laws. The fiduciary duty of directors is the outcome brought about by the adjustment of trust law under the trust relationship between directors and corporation. By the study on the fiduciary duty of directors, we can specify and deepen the directors' duty of care and duty of loyalty, hence a satisfactory solution of the legal regulation of the actions of directors in terms of both legislation and judicature.

关 键 词：信托 注意义务 忠实义务 

分 类 号：D912.29[政治法律—民商法学]