风险企业控制权分配模型研究  

Study on allocation model of control rights in venture firms

作　　者：安实[1] 王健[1] 何琳[2] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001 [2]中国保险监督管理委员会哈尔滨办事处,黑龙江哈尔滨150010

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2004年第1期38-44,共7页Journal of Systems Engineering

摘　　要：风险投资的高风险性、信息不对称性,使风险投资中控制权分配问题逐渐成为关系到风险投资项目成败的关键.对风险企业控制权在其执行过程中如何分配的问题进行了定量的研究,可作为风险资本家参与风险企业控制权分配和进行投资决策的依据.通过构造风险企业家和风险资本家的效用函数,分析风险企业家和风险资本家的目标函数和约束条件,建立了控制权分配模型并设计了相应的算法.该模型求解可以实现风险资本家和企业家的期望效用最大化,按照最优解分配控制权则能够在保证投资人利益的同时最大限度地促进了风险企业成长.High risks and asymmetric information in venture finance lead the allocation of control rights in venture firms to a key of success in venture finance. This paper quantificationally discusses how to allocate the control rights between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in the process of executing the rights, which is instructive for venture capitalists who participate in the allocation of control rights and make decision on investment. By creating utility functions for venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, and analyzing their objective functions and constraints, this paper establishes a model of allocating control rights, and designs an algorithm for the model. The process of seeking solution for the model makes the expectation utilities of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs maximized. Control rights are allocated in the form of optimal solution, which can ensure the interest of investor and speed up the growth of venture firms.

关 键 词：风险投资 控制权分配模型 投资决策 目标函数 风险企业 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]