非对称信息下供需链中供应商的回购决策分析  

Supplier′s optimal buy back decision under asymmetric information in a two-stage supply chain

作　　者：索寒生[1] 金以慧[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学自动化系,北京100084

出　　处：《控制与决策》2004年第3期335-338,共4页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60174046).

摘　　要：为了解决供需链中下游实体的成本是私有信息的情况下,上游供应商的回购决策问题,运用委托-代理模型研究了供应商的最优回购策略,得到了供应商的最优决策方案.与对称信息的情况相比,信息结构的非对称导致下游实体的订货量低于系统的最优订货量,使得供需链无法达到协调,供需链的总利润和供应商的利润降低,零售商的利润增加.在非对称信息下,供应商提供的契约菜单值随着下游实体成本的增加而增大.The problem of designing an optimal buy back contract to maximize the supplier's profits in a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain is solved. When the marginal cost of the retailer is private information, principal-agent models are used to derive the supplier's optimal buy back policy. It is shown that it is no longer possible to let the retailer's order quantity achieve the solution when the supplier has complete information. And the supply chain coordination is not obtained. The total profits and the supplier's profits are lowered while those of the buyer are improved. The value of supplier's contracts menu augments with the increase of the marginal cost of the retailer.

关 键 词：供需链 供需链契约 协调 回购 非对称信息 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学] TP29[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]