供应链中信息共享的最优程度与制度安排  

The Optimal Information Sharing Degree and Regulation Arrangement in Supply Chain

作　　者：常志平[1] 蒋馥[1] 常志平 蒋馥[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰管理学院，上海200052

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2004年第3期484-488,共5页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70271038)

摘　　要：以经销商向制造商提供信息共享为例,在考虑信息共享费用的基础上,通过建立模型,对3种可能的制度安排下经销商的最优信息共享程度进行了研究.结果发现,制度商提前确定批发商价格会激励经销商进行信息共享,而保留定价的灵活性会挫伤经销商进行信息共享的积极性.通过对比分析3种制度安排下制造商、经销商和整个供应链利润,指出了它们各自最优的制度安排.Taking retailer sharing information with the manufacturer as an example, through building the model, which considers the cost of information sharing, this paper analyzed the optimal degree of information sharing from the view of the retailer in three possible regulation arrangements. It was found that the manufacturer committing the wholesale price before would stimulate the retailer to share information, but the manufacturer keeping the flexibility of wholesale price would discourage the retailer to share information. Compared the profits of the manufacturer, retailer and the whole supply chain in three possible regulation arrangements, this paper outlined their optimal regulation arrangement respectively. It is instructive to supply chain management in the reality.

关 键 词：供应链 信息共享 制度安排 最优化 

分 类 号：F406.2[经济管理—产业经济]