Stackelberg模型的拓展及在政府对发电市场规制中的应用  

The Development of Stackelberg Model and the Application for Government Regulation in Generation Market

作　　者：任玉珑[1] 张新华[1] 邹小燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2004年第2期117-119,共3页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70071036)。

摘　　要：本文基于政府规制的思想,借鉴Stackelberg模型的动态博弈研究方法,通过研究政府和发电企业的行为策略,建立了二阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,然后在对模型均衡解分析的基础上,刻画出发电市场的最优规模,紧接着进行算例分析,并得出了结论。Based on the view of goverment regulation,using dynamic game method of Stackelberg model for reference,this paper sets up a game model with two phases in which the behaviors of government and generation units are variable for power market.Then through analysis for equilibrium result of the model,the optimal scale of generation is attained.In the end,a simple numerical example is served for illustrating the presented model and some conclusions are draw.

关 键 词：政府规制 发电市场 最优规模 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]