灌区资产剩余控制权安排——理论模型及政策含义  

Governance Structure Of Residual Control Rights Over Irrigation Infrastructure-A Theoretic Model And Implications For Policies

作　　者：韩洪云[1] 赵连阁[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学管理学院,310029 [2]杭州商学院经济学院,310035

出　　处：《经济研究》2004年第4期117-124,126,共9页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"水价政策变化对灌区农业;环境的影响"(项目编号:70273023);国家社会科学基金项目"基于水价政策变化的灌区水资源优化配置研究"(项目编号:03BJY038)研究成果的一部分

摘　　要：本文认为用水者协会和供水组织风险态度是决定灌区资产剩余控制权安排的主要因素 ,用水者协会和供水组织的灌区资产剩余控制权份额随其风险厌恶程度的提高而降低、灌区资产剩余控制权安排内在于水生产过程本身 ,是资产剩余控制权安排收益和成本对比的结果。只要灌区资产折旧对用水者协会灌区维护努力水平和供水组织生产努力水平的敏感程度不为零 ,灌区资产的联合拥有是灌区资产剩余控制权安排的合理选择。建立经济自立灌区和用水者协会不应该是灌区管理体制改革的终极目标 ,解决灌区资产剩余控制权权属是灌区管理体制改革的核心。The attitudes towards risks of WSC(water supply company) and WUAs(water users association) is the main factor underlying arrangements of residual control rights. Besides it, variances of variables and the sensitive level of depreciation to efforts from WSC or WUAS determine the settings of residual control rights. If the sensitive extent of depreciation to efforts chosen by WSC and WUAs is not zero, the joint governance structure of residual control rights is optimal. The governance structure of residual control rights over irrigation infrastructure is an outcome of comparison between the gains induced by decreasing opportunism and costs induced by decreasing incentives of ownership. It should not be a final goal to establish the financially autonomous WSC and WUAs, the core of management reform of an irrigation district is the allocation of the residual control rights.

关 键 词：灌区管理 水资源利用率 剩余控制权 中国 经营自主权 灌区资产 产权经济学 理论模型 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]