公共管理行为控制中的激励问题  

The Issue of Encouragement in Controlling Public Management Behavior

作　　者：张正军[1] 

机构地区：[1]陕西师范大学国际商学院

出　　处：《学术月刊》2004年第5期16-23,共8页Academic Monthly

摘　　要：由于缺乏竞争性市场的压力和收益激励,公共管理中存在诸多偏离公共利益目标的机会主义行为。机会主义惯于利用信息偏在及其支持条件并具有隐蔽性,依靠强制性制度实施控制效力有限。激励控制是更为有效的一种方式。“委托—代理”模型在公共管理系统中的应用深化了人们对于激励控制的认识和机制设计,却仍存在诸多弊端需要补充和修正。激励控制模型的改进或重建,应在此基础上对公共管理目标和人性假设进行重新理解或界定,以制度变革为形式,通过增强委托人与代理人的相互信任、强化道德自律的功能、顾及控制结果影响的相互性及承认强制性制度安排对激励控制机制建构的基始作用来实现。There are so much opportunist behavior which deviate from the target of public interests for lack of a pressure of competitive market and stimulation of interests. Oppotunism consistently uses information aberration and its supporting conditions and has its covert. It is limited in relying on compelling institutions to practice its efficiency of control. The control of encouragement is a more efficient way. The application of 'entrust-agent' pattern in the public management system deepened people's recognition of controlling of encouragement and designing of mechanism, but there still exist so many flaws to be replenished and revisioned. The improvement or reconstruction of the pattern of controlling encouragement should re-understand or re-define, on such a basis, the target of public management and the assumption of human nature, and by taking the form of institutional revolution, to be realized through strengthening mutual trust between principal and agent, enhancing the function of self-discipline in ethics, paying attention to the mutuality of controlling result and effect, and recognizing the fundamental function of compelling institutional arrangement over the configuration of a mechanism of controlling encouragement.

关 键 词：公共管理行为 机会主义 激励控制机制 道德自律 私营管理 “委托-代理”模型 强制性制度 

分 类 号：C936[经济管理—管理学]