我国投资银行产业拥挤的成因、影响与对策——基于产权理论的分析  

Causes,Effects,and Strategies for the Industrial Congestion of China's Investment Banks—An Analysis Based on Property Rights Theory

作　　者：张璟[1] 戴文俊[2] 莫学斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学金融学系,江苏南京210093 [2]南京大学会计学系,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《西安石油大学学报（社会科学版）》2004年第2期30-36,共7页Journal of Xi’an Shiyou University:Social Science Edition

摘　　要：投资银行业产权公有以及基于公有产权上的自由进入使各投资银行产生对市场“所有权”的竞争性争夺。在先占原则下确立的“私有”产权是通过对资源的实际使用而获得的 ,这种产权没有明确的边界 ,从而导致了产业拥挤的矛盾与冲突 ,在我国有其具体的表现形式。着重分析了我国投资银行产业拥挤的成因和可能的影响 。The public ownership of China's investment banks and the free access to financial markets based on publicly owned property rights have made all investment banks compete for the“ownership”of financial markets.The“privately-owned”property rights established on the principle of preemption are obtained by the actual use of resources.Such property rights without definite boundaries have led to industrial congestion,which has found specific expression in China today.In this paper,focus is put on the analysis of the causes and possible effects of the industrial congestion of China's investment banks and a case study is made of the institutional performance constrained by property rights.

关 键 词：产权理论 投资银行 中国 证券市场 绩效考核机制 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]