对我国银行卡收费问题的经济分析及政策建议  

Economic Analysis of Charges on Bankcards in Our Country and Policy Suggestions

作　　者：黄彦甦 

机构地区：[1]中国工商银行城市金融研究所

出　　处：《金融论坛》2004年第6期28-34,共7页Finance Forum

摘　　要：本文从完全信息动态博弈假设出发研究银行卡收费的问题,探讨收费是否符合银行的经济利益,得出以下基本结论:加大中间业务收费力度、提高非利息收入比例是大势所趋;收费决策受收益水平、客户敏感度、自身规模等多种因素影响;农业银行收费是“个行理性”的行为;其他国有商业银行和交通银行都应加入收费的行列;招商银行的理性行为是不收费;其他中小银行目前的最佳选择是观望等待。在具体实践中,国有商业银行应该谨慎而坚定地推行服务收费,充分认识到收费的“双刃剑”效应,采取必要措施消除其负面影响;大多数中小银行在追求整体效益和经济规模的目标下会继续实施免费。In the present paper,charges on bankcards are under scrutiny,using complete information dynamic gaming hypothesis,to see if they are economically in the interest of banks and conclusion is drawn that efforts to charge intermediate business should be strengthened and the proportion of non-interest income is to be raised inevitably;decision to charge is influenced by profitability,customer sensitivity and bank size;fees collected by Agricultural Bank is an'individual bank's rational'act;other state-owned commercial banks and Bank of Communication should follow the suit.In contrast,the rational act of China Merchants Bank is to offer free service.In practice,state-owned commercial banks should collect service charge cautiously and yet firmly and be fully aware of the double-edge effect of service charge and take necessary measure against adversary effect;most small and medium-sized banks will continue to offer free service,aiming at overall economic returns and scales.

关 键 词：银行卡收费问题 商业银行 完全信息动态博弈模型 纳什均衡 客户敏感系数 定量分析 

分 类 号：F832.2[经济管理—金融学]