金融投资中介化与资产泡沫研究  

A Study on Delegated Investment by Financial Intermediaries and Asset Bubbles

作　　者：蔡庆丰[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学金融系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《财经研究》2004年第7期35-43,共9页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学博士点基金项目"中国股市效率损失研究"(01JB790027)

摘　　要：随着金融市场的发展,越来越多的投资者通过机构投资者等金融中介间接参与金融市场投资。投资者和金融中介之间的委托代理问题以及由此产生的风险转嫁倾向使得金融中介的投资决策并不总是以投资者的利益最大化为目标。本文通过模型分析,证明了金融中介的风险转移倾向容易导致风险资产的均衡价格偏离其基础价值,引起资产泡沫的产生。With the development of financial market, more and more investors indirectly participate in the investment in financial market via such financial intermediaries as institution investors. Due to the agency problem between investors and financial intermediaries and resulted risk shift, the investment decision doesn't always aim at the maximization of investors' profit. Through model analysis, the paper proves that the tendency of risk-shifting in financial intermediaries easily leads to the deviation of the price of risk assets from their fundamental value, thus resulting in bubbles.

关 键 词：金融中介 代理投资 资产泡沫 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]