升值压力的缓解:利率机制和政府对策  

On the Appreciation Pressure: the Interest Rate Mechanism and Government Policie

作　　者：孙华妤[1] 马跃[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院,北京100029

出　　处：《金融研究》2004年第6期17-26,共10页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：对外经济贸易大学"211工程"子项目"对外开放;金融体制改革与金融体系的稳定性研究"的部分成果

摘　　要：作者建立了一个钉住汇率制度下的开放宏观经济动态模型,规范地描述在经常账户完全可兑换、资本账户部分可兑换、国内政策和经济基本面表现良好的条件下,持续的国际收支顺差,如何形成对钉住平价的升值压力。运用该模型揭示了市场导向的利率形成机制能够起"内在稳定器"作用来舒缓这一压力,但是不能完全化解它,从而有可能形成特殊的升值压力下的货币危机。但是依据这个模型可以得到若干可供选择的政策干预措施和制度改进建议,来补充利率自动调节机制的不足,维护钉住汇率平价。其中最关键的原则是,政策抉择必须依据冲击来自资本账户抑或经常账户而定,否则将事与愿违,加速钉住汇率平价崩溃。In this paper the authors establish a simple open macroeconomic model to describe how the appreciation pressures accumulating as a result of a persistent external positive balance of payments under the economic circumstances maintaining current account convertibility and capital control in some degree, the domestic policy and the sound economic fundamental. This model displays that the determining mechanism of the market - oriented interest rates can act as an automatic stabilizer to ease the appreciation pressures but cannot resolve them. If there is no any external intervention, the pegged parity will collapse. Some strategy options for the government in this situation can be shed light on by this model, and the major suggestion is that policies must be the choice depended on the nature of the shock.

关 键 词：升值压力 钉住汇率制度 自动稳定器 政策干预 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]