环境污染治理的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Disposal of Environmental Pollution

作　　者：王斌[1] 张英杰[1] 孙志和[1] 

机构地区：[1]青岛建筑工程学院,青岛266033

出　　处：《青岛建筑工程学院学报》2004年第2期103-106,共4页Journal of Qingdao Institute of Architecture and Engineering

摘　　要：针对环境污染治理过程中存在的信息不对称性 ,建立了政府环保稽查部门和污染企业的两种不完全信息动态模型 ,给出了各自的子博弈精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡 ,提出了为杜绝治污过程中存在的欺骗行为 。Aiming at the unsymmetrical phenomenon of information during the disposal of environmental pollution, we establish two incomplete information dynamic models concerning government, environmental protection inspection department and enterprises causing pollution, give the sub game refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and put forward the solution which government and environmental protection departments should adopt to prevent the deception behavior in the course of disposal.

关 键 词：污染治理 不完全信息动态博弈 子博弈精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]