老龄化背景下养老产业与政府监管的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Pension Industry and Government Supervision under the Background of Aging

作　　者：剡成文 马国顺 

机构地区：[1]西北师范大学数学与统计学院,甘肃 兰州

出　　处：《应用数学进展》2022年第1期93-101,共9页Advances in Applied Mathematics

摘　　要：随着中国人口老龄化的现象日益加重,发展养老产业已是人口老龄化发展的必然需求。企业的发展需要政府的扶持,但由于企业和政府之间存在信息不对称,同时企业基于利益最大化的动机,一些企业可能会做出些不合规的行为,同时若政府监督力度不足,会大幅度影响养老产业的发展。文章通过建立复制者动态方程,从演化博弈的视角分析了政府监管部门和企业之间的博弈策略演化过程,得出双方策略的演化稳定策略。With the increasing aging of the population in China, the development of pension industry has become an inevitable demand for the development of the aging population. Enterprise development needs the support of the government, but because of information asymmetry between the government and the enterprises, and enterprises based on the motivation of benefit maximization, some companies may make non-compliance behavior. At the same time, if government supervision is insufficient, it will greatly affect the development of the pension industry. By establishing the dynamic equation of replicator, this paper analyzes the evolutionary process of the game strategy between the government regulatory department and the enterprise from the perspective of evolutionary game, and obtains the evolutionary stability strategy of the two parties’ strategy.

关 键 词：人口老龄化 养老产业 演化博弈 复制动态方程 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：C913.6[经济管理] C924.24[社会学]