探析“绿蓝悖论”的三种解悖方案  

Three Solutions to the Grue Paradox

作　　者：刘蕾[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海大学马克思主义学院,上海

出　　处：《哲学进展》2023年第8期1680-1684,共5页Advances in Philosophy

摘　　要：继休谟(David Hume)的“旧归纳之谜”后,古德曼(Nelson Goodman)在其著作《事实、虚构和预测》(1955年)中提出的“新归纳之谜”,即“绿蓝–蓝绿悖论”(简称“绿蓝悖论”),在西方哲学界也引起了广泛的讨论。关于“绿蓝悖论”的解悖方案层出不穷,有语言论方案、科学方法论方案等等。其中古德曼、阿钦斯坦(Peter Achinstein)以及范式模型的解悖方案采取不同的研究路径,且在众多解悖方案中比较具有代表性。文章通过对这三种不同解悖方案的分析探讨,进一步探究了“绿蓝悖论”解决的可能性。After Hume came up with the induction riddle, Nelson Goodman proposed the new riddle of inductionin his book Fact, Fiction and Prediction (1955), namely the “grue-bleen paradox”, which has caused extensive discussion in western philosophy circles. Solutions to “grue paradox” emerge in an endless stream, including language theory, scientific methodology and so on. Among them, Goodman’s method, Peter Achinstein’s method and the programme of the paradigm model take different research paths, and are relatively representative among many solutions. Through the analysis and discussion of these three different solutions to the paradox, the possibility of solving the “grue paradox” is further explored.

关 键 词：“绿蓝悖论” 解悖方案 古德曼 阿钦斯坦 范式模型 

分 类 号：I20[文学—中国文学]