以柏拉图灵魂观统一“相”和个别事物  

Unifying the “Eidos” and Individual Things with Plato’s View of the Soul

作　　者：杨弘川 

机构地区：[1]贵州大学哲学学院,贵州 贵阳

出　　处：《哲学进展》2024年第8期1916-1923,共8页Advances in Philosophy

摘　　要：柏拉图的“相”论提出之后,分有“相”(Eidos)的具体可感存在物和“相”就有巨大的鸿沟,如何将个别的存在物和普遍存在物统一起来,是柏拉图一直想完成的。如果柏拉图的“相”论是从本体论的角度研究存在物,那么柏拉图的灵魂论就是从认识论的角度研究存在物。笔者从柏拉图的灵魂论(认识论)入手,去统一具体可感的存在物和“相”。具体可感的存在物是感官的认识对象,“相”是灵魂中理智的认识对象,感官是躯体的认识能力,理智是灵魂的认识能力,它们都统一于具体的理性存在者(人)之中。After Plato’s theory of “eidos” was proposed, there was a huge gap between the concrete perceptible existences and “eidos”. How to unify individual existences with universal existences has always been Plato’s goal. If Plato’s theory of “eidos” studies existence from an ontological perspective, then Plato’s theory of the soul studies existence from an epistemological perspective. Starting from Plato’s theory of the soul (epistemology), the author aims to unify concrete and perceptible existences and “eidos”. The perceptible existence is the object of sense cognition, while “eidos” is the object of rational cognition in the soul. Sensory organ is the cognitive ability of the body, and the reason is the cognitive ability of the soul, both of which are unified in the concrete and rational being (human).

关 键 词：柏拉图 相 灵魂 认识论 

分 类 号：O17[理学—数学]