基于动态演化博弈的海水养殖尾水污染物排放标准采纳行为分析  

Analysis of the Adoption Behavior of Effluent Pollutant Discharge Standards for Marine Aquaculture Based on Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：翟浩杰 田野 韩少强 苑辉 

机构地区：[1]天津市生态环境监测中心,天津

出　　处：《海洋科学前沿》2024年第4期153-160,共8页Advances in Marine Sciences

摘　　要：采用演化博弈模型分析海水养殖尾水污染物排放标准的采纳问题,构建了标准监管部门和海水养殖主体之间的标准采纳演化博弈模型,分析双方对于标准采纳与监管的动态演化过程。并以天津市《海水养殖尾水污染物排放标准》的发布为例,研究了标准发布后海水养殖尾水污染物排放标准的采纳,受到标准监管部门的标准监督成本、标准处罚力度、养殖主体不采纳标准发生的损失以及概率的影响。The evolutionary game model is used to analyze the adoption of the discharge standards of mariculture tail water pollutants, and the standard adoption evolutionary game model between standard regulatory departments and mariculture subjects is constructed, and the dynamic evolution process of standard adoption and supervision of both sides is analyzed. Taking the release of Discharge Standards for Mariculture Tail Water Pollutants in Tianjin as an example, the adoption of the discharge standards after the release of the standards was studied, which was affected by the standard supervision cost of the standard supervision department, the severity of the standard punishment, the loss of the standard and the probability.

关 键 词：海水养殖尾水 污染物排放标准 演化博弈 标准采纳 

分 类 号：F20[经济管理—国民经济]