土地合作社制度下的收益分配主体间演化博弈分析  

The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprise’s Income Distribution in Land Joint-Stock Cooperative System Reform

作　　者：陈美招 郑荣宝[2] 张雅琪[2] Meizhao Chen;Rongbao Zheng;Yaqi Zhang(School of Social and Public Administration, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou Guangdong;College of Management, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou Guangdong)

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学,社会与公共管理学院,广东广州 [2]广东工业大学,管理学院,广东广州

出　　处：《社会科学前沿》2019年第1期167-174,共8页Advances in Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(批准号:41001054);教育部人文社会科学研究(批准号:18YJAZH063);广东省国土资源厅科技项目“村土地利用规划编制技术与规范研究”(GDGTKJ2018001)。

摘　　要：土地股份合作制改革从根本上转变农村集体土地现有的经营方式,提高了村民收入,但是由此引发的土地收益分配不公平问题却日益严重。本文以广州市天河区龙洞村为例,基于复制者动态模型建立了政府、经济联社及村民之间的收益矩阵,并采用雅格比迭代法对该模型均衡点的稳定性进行演化博弈分析。结果表明:当三群体收益矩阵方程的均衡点到达[1,0,0]时,系统方程处于稳定状态,政府、经济联社及村民所做出的策略组合为{监管,不可持续经营,保持缄默},从该策略组合中可以看出,政府虽有采取监管措施,却容易导致经济联社经营不规范、村民维权意识淡薄等问题。The land joint-stock cooperative system reform can change the existing business model of rural collective land, and rise peasants’ income, however, the resulting problem of inequalities of land revenue distribution is increasingly more serious. Taking Longdong village in Tianhe district of Guangzhou city as an example, this paper builds a pay off matrix model among government, eco-nomic association and villagers based on replicated dynamic model, and applies the Jacobi itera-tion method to analyze the stability of the equilibrium point. Model results show that the system of equations is in a stable state when equilibrium pay off matrix equation of the three groups reaches [1,0,0]. Thus, the government, economic association and villagers make decision to the strategy combination {regulation, unsustainable management, silence}. We find that although government takes regulation, the economic association lacks of standard operation. Moreover, the villagers are often short of protection of rights when they face damages on rights and interests.

关 键 词：土地 股份合作 收益分配 利益主体 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F2[经济管理—国民经济]