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作 者:李南骏
机构地区:[1]重庆大学,公共管理学院,重庆
出 处:《社会科学前沿》2022年第1期244-251,共8页Advances in Social Sciences
摘 要:政治锦标赛理论是目前学界对地方政府有效激励的权威理论之一,也是许多学者参考用于解释央地政府互动和博弈行为的理论基础。文章通过梳理相关研究,结合我国目前的地方政府运行状况,分析地方政府治理实践中的问题,得出结论:政治锦标赛和理论仍然是对地方政府激励的较优解释,但是在不断发展的社会情境中需要有所扩展和更新,以完善理论对不断复杂化现实问题的解释能力。Political tournament theory is one of the authoritative theories of effective incentive to local governments in academic circles. It is also the theoretical basis for many scholars to explain the interaction and game behavior of central and local governments. By combing the relevant research, combined with the current operation status of local governments, this paper analyzes the problems in the practice of local government governance, and comes to the conclusion that political tournaments and theories are still a better explanation for the incentive of local governments, but they need to be expanded and updated in the developing social situation to improve the ability of the theory to explain the increasingly complex practical problems.
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