股东失权的诉讼救济途径的实务探究——以公司法第五十二条为依据  

A Practical Exploration of Litigation Remedies for Shareholder Disenfranchisement —Based on Article 52 of the Company Law

作　　者：罗昕璇 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学法学院,辽宁 大连

出　　处：《社会科学前沿》2024年第11期87-94,共8页Advances in Social Sciences

摘　　要：新《公司法》在条文内容方面实质性改动涉及上百余条,改动之处对于审判实践也造成相应的影响。而涉及到“股东出资”一问题,历来是《公司法》立法修订与司法审判关注的热点问题,在本次的修订过程中,更是创新性地首次引入“股东失权”规则。为此,研究在申明“股东失权”规则的立法意图的基础上,详细论证该规则的法理依据,且同时叙明在理论乃至于实践中“股东失权”与“股东除名”规则二者之间的区别,以明确股东失权规则的独立价值。其后,在表明该制度的功能与价值应用是为维护公司资本充实与保护债权人利益的前提下,同时提出失权规则可能存在的制度缺陷以及因此可能造成的规则滥用风险,并针对上述问题,提出在诉讼上应进一步完善股东异议(诉讼救济)的权利,防止股东失权规则的滥用。The new Company Law has undergone substantial revisions affecting over one hundred provisions, with consequential impacts on judicial practice. The issue of “shareholder capital contribution” has consistently been a focal point in both legislative amendments and judicial adjudication of the Company Law. Notably, this revision innovatively introduces the “shareholder disenfranchisement” rule for the first time. This research elucidates the legislative intent behind the “shareholder disenfranchisement” rule and provides a detailed exposition of its jurisprudential basis. It further delineates the distinctions between “shareholder disenfranchisement” and “shareholder expulsion” rules in both theory and practice, thereby establishing the independent value of the shareholder disenfranchisement rule. The study posits that the function and value of this system lie in maintaining capital adequacy and protecting creditors’ interests. However, it also identifies potential systemic deficiencies and the risk of rule abuse. To address these concerns, the research proposes further refine

关 键 词：股东失权 股东除名 股东异议权 失权救济 

分 类 号：D92[政治法律—法学]