我国智能投顾中的投资者利益保护  

Investors’ Interests Protection of Intelligent Investment Advisers in China

作　　者：刘蓓 

机构地区：[1]上海政法学院法律学院,上海

出　　处：《争议解决》2023年第4期1261-1268,共8页Dispute Settlement

摘　　要：不同于传统金融业务模式,智能投顾因其内嵌的算法使其天然地具有制度与监管的薄弱性,我国人工智能的发展仍处于“弱”智能阶段,人工智能并未取得主体地位。智能投顾中,信义义务作为保护消费者利益的最有利手段仍固化于其中,信义义务的主体仍为金融机构以及金融服务从业人员,算法研发设计者仅负产品研发者的义务,只不过信义义务的内容相较于传统业务有所不同。算法语境下信义义务内容的更新,使得原有监管模式举步维艰,借鉴域外经验,对智能投顾的监管应区别机构与人员的不同而从不同阶段进行动态监管,以保证智能投顾始终保持对投资者忠诚而非成为机构的代理。Different from the traditional financial business model, intelligent investment advisers because of its embedded algorithm to make it naturally have the weakness of system and regulation, the development of artificial intelligence in our country is still in the “weak” stage of intelligence, artificial intelligence has not obtained the main body position. In intelligent investment advisers, fiduciary duty is still fixed as the most advantageous means to protect the interests of consumers. The subject of fiduciary duty is still financial institutions and financial service practitioners, and algorithm R&D designers only bear the duty of product developers, but the content of fiduciary duty is different from that of traditional business. The update of fiduciary duty content in the context of algorithms has made the original regulatory model difficult. Learning from foreign experience, the regulation of intelligent investment advisers should distinguish the differences of institutions and personnel and carry out dynamic supervision at different stages, so as to ensure that intelligent investment advisers always remain loyal to investors rather than becoming agents of institutions.

关 键 词：智能投资顾问 利益保护 信义义务 金融监管 

分 类 号：F83[经济管理—金融学]