GATT国家安全例外条款的最新发展  

The New Development of National Security Exception Clause in GATT

作　　者：李嘉骏 

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学国际法学院,上海

出　　处：《争议解决》2024年第1期405-411,共7页Dispute Settlement

摘　　要：随着近十年来的国际贸易争端的增加和贸易保护主义的抬头,1994年《关税与贸易总协定》第21条国家安全例外条款逐渐被越来越多的WTO成员国援引作为实施单边措施的依据。该条款在赋予成员方在特定情形下享有采取措施维护其基本安全利益的自决权的同时又存在巨大的不确定性。在2019年发布的“俄罗斯运输限制措施案”专家组报告中,WTO专家组历史上第一次对国家安全例外条款的可裁判性、专家组的审查权等方面均作出了较为明确的解释。但这些解释并不充分,当前国家安全例外条款的适用上仍然存在失衡的问题,在各成员方保持高度克制的同时探索多元的争端解决机制是当下需要思考的一个方向。Over the past decade, with the increase of international trade disputes and the resurgence of trade protectionism, the national security exception clause of Article 21 of the “General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” 1994 (GATT) has increasingly been invoked by WTO members for implementing unilateral measures. This article grants members the right to self-judge in taking measures to safeguard their essential security interests under specific circumstances, albeit with considerable uncertainty. In the panel report of “Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit” (DS512) published in 2019, for the first time of the WTO panel, relatively clarifying the justiciability of the clause and the review of the panel. However, these explanations remain insufficient, resulting in an imbalance in the application of the national security exception clause. At present, it is a consideration worthy direction to explore multiple dispute settlement mechanisms while maintaining a high degree of restraint among members.

关 键 词：国家安全例外条款 自决权 基本安全利益 

分 类 号：F75[经济管理—国际贸易]