大股东掏空行为对审计师行为的影响  

The Impact of Major Shareholder Hollowing Behavior on the Behavior of Auditors

作　　者：周卓悦 

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学政府审计学院,江苏 南京

出　　处：《国际会计前沿》2025年第1期26-37,共12页Frontiers of International Accounting

摘　　要：近年来,大股东掏空行为在上市公司中较为常见,严重损害了公司及中小股东的利益,同时也会对审计师的行为产生一定的影响,使得其审计费用、审计意见随之发生改变。本文以2018~2023年A股上市公司为研究样本,实证分析大股东掏空行为与审计师行为之间的关系。结果表明,大股东掏空行为会显著增加审计师的审计费用以及对审计意见的更改也呈显著正相关关系。进一步分析表明,在非国有企业、东部和西部地区,该正相关关系更为显著。In recent years, the hollowing behavior of major shareholders has become more common in listed companies, which seriously damages the interests of the company and minority shareholders. Meanwhile, it will also have a certain impact on the behavior of auditors, making their audit costs and audit opinions change accordingly. This paper takes a-share listed companies from 2018 to 2023 as a research sample to empirically analyze the relationship between the hollowing behavior of major shareholders and the behavior of auditors. The results show that the hollowing of major shareholders will significantly increase the audit fees of auditors and change the opinions of audit opinions. Further analysis showed that the positive correlation was more significant in non-state-owned enterprises, the eastern and western regions.

关 键 词：掏空行为 审计质量 审计意见 委托代理理论 信号传递理论 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]