政府–企业–消费者绿色技术创新系统三方演化博弈研究  

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study of the Government-Enterprises-Consumers Green Technology Innovation System

作　　者：高天宇 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海

出　　处：《现代管理》2025年第2期171-185,共15页Modern Management

摘　　要：本文构建了三方演化博弈模型以研究绿色技术创新决策过程中政府–企业–消费者三方的相互影响作用及演化均衡条件。结果表明:不同条件下,政府、企业、消费者的均衡结果不同,影响均衡的参数包括补贴、惩罚力度、成本、收益等,且消费者多为受影响方;政府可通过调整补贴与惩罚力度,影响企业与消费者,实现绿色转型均衡,但该均衡依赖政府干预,要达到无需干预的绿色市场,需依各方初始意愿调整补贴与惩罚力度,不当退出会致市场退回传统模式;企业应借助政府补贴支持,降本增效,加大绿色技术研发投入,降低边际成本,提高整体收益,引导消费者形成绿色偏好,推动市场进入供需良性循环,深化绿色转型。This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to study the interactive effects of the government-enterprise-consumer in the decision-making process of green technological innovation, as well as the conditions for evolutionary equilibrium. The results show that under different conditions, the equilibrium outcomes for three parties are different. The parameters affecting the equilibrium include subsidies, punishment intensity, costs, and benefits, etc., and consumers are mostly the affected party. The government can influence enterprises and consumers by adjusting subsidies and punishment intensity to achieve a green transformation equilibrium. However, this equilibrium depends on government intervention. To reach a green market that requires no intervention, it is necessary to adjust subsidies and punishment intensity based on the initial preferences of all parties. Improper withdrawal can lead the market to revert to the traditional model. Enterprises should take advantage of government subsidies to reduce costs and increase efficiency, increase investment in green technology research and development, reduce marginal costs, and improve overall benefits. They should guide consumers to form green preferences, promot

关 键 词：绿色技术创新系统 演化博弈 环境规制 政府监管 创新补贴 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济]