不同双渠道结构下制造商直接回收的闭环供应链最优定价决策  

The Optimal Pricing Decision of the Closed-Loop Supply Chain of Direct Recycling by Manufacturers under Different Dual-Channel Structures

作　　者：鞠凯强 徐超 杨家兴 

机构地区：[1]江西理工大学经济管理学院,江西 赣州

出　　处：《管理科学与工程》2025年第1期39-45,共7页Management Science and Engineering

摘　　要：本文构建了两种不同的闭环供应链博弈模型:一种是制造商自建直销渠道,另一种则是委托网络运营商进行代销。通过这两种模型,我们深入探讨了在不同双渠道结构下,制造商直接回收废旧产品时,供应链各成员所面临的闭环供应链定价决策问题。研究表明:两种渠道下单位废旧产品最优回收价格相同,与制造商回收成本负相关,与消费者对回收价格的敏感系数正相关。制造商直销渠道下,产品的最优批发价格和零售价格不受传统销售渠道下零售商定价的影响,而零售商的零售价格则与产品价格竞争系数负相关。此外,网络运营商代销渠道下,制造商利润和零售商利润均与网络运营商的佣金比例系数负相关。This paper constructs two different closed-loop supply chain game models: one is the manufacturer’s own direct sales channel, and the other is entrusted to the network operator to carry out consignment sales. Through these two models, we delve into the closed-loop supply chain pricing decisions faced by various members of the supply chain when manufacturers directly recycle used products under different dual-channel structures. The results show that the optimal recycling price per unit of waste product is the same under the two channels, which is negatively correlated with the manufacturer’s recycling cost and positively correlated with the consumer’s sensitivity coefficient to the recycling price. Under the manufacturer’s direct sales channel, the optimal wholesale price and retail price of the product are not affected by the retailer’s pricing under the traditional sales channel, while the retailer’s retail price is negatively correlated with the price competition coefficient of the product. In addition, under the consignment channel of network operators, the profit of manufacturers and retailers are negatively correlated with the commission ratio coefficient of network operators.

关 键 词：双渠道供应链 闭环供应链 供应链决策 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济]