扼杀式并购的反垄断法规制路径  

Anti-Monopoly Law Regulation Path of Strangled Merger and Acquisition

作　　者：李丹丹 

机构地区：[1]贵州大学法学院经济法学,贵州 贵阳

出　　处：《法学（汉斯）》2023年第2期794-801,共8页Open Journal of Legal Science

摘　　要：随着我国平台经济迅速发展,一些大型平台为了维护自身在市场中的优势地位、排除潜在竞争,从而对可能构成竞争威胁的初创中小平台企业进行扼杀式并购。由于传统评估标准在互联网平台经济下无法生效,以及反垄断执法机构对于扼杀式并购的识别、事后干预具有滞后性等原因,企业并购长期逃脱反垄断审查,而扼杀式并购确实存在阻碍市场创新、损害消费者权益、破坏市场经济秩序等竞争隐忧。本文通过对扼杀式并购的违法性进行判定和探究其反垄断规制路径,以政府监管为主导,发挥反垄断法对扼杀式并购行为的规制效果,为中小平台企业创造公平自由的市场竞争环境。With the rapid development of China’s platform economy, some large platforms want to maintain their dominant position in the market and eliminate potential competition, they could make strangling acquisitions of start-ups that pose a competitive threat. Due to the traditional evaluation standard cannot take effect under the Internet platform economy, and the antitrust law enforcement agencies for killing mergers and acquisitions identification, afterwards intervention has lag, mergers escape antitrust review for a long time, and kill mergers and acquisitions does hinder market innovation, damage consumer rights and interests, destroy the market economic order competition concerns. This paper makes a determination and exploration of the illegality of the anti-monopoly regulation path, takes the government regulation as the leading role, gives full play to the regulation effect of the anti-monopoly law, and creates a fair and free market competition environment for small and medium-sized platform enterprises.

关 键 词：扼杀式并购 平台经济 初创企业 经营者集中 

分 类 号：D92[政治法律—法学]