欧盟质量型选择性分销协议适用Metro标准合理规则的困境——以限制网络销售为例  

The Dilemma of Applying the Appropriate Rules of the Metro Criteria to the EU Qualitative Selective Distribution Agreement—Taking the Example of Restricting Online Sales

作　　者：张益驰 

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学法政学院、史量才新闻与传播学院,浙江 杭州

出　　处：《法学（汉斯）》2023年第6期4663-4668,共6页Open Journal of Legal Science

摘　　要：纵向限制是近年来欧洲竞争法中争议较大的领域,本文探究纵向限制中质量型选择性分销协议的合法性认定标准。在欧盟的纵向限制规制框架下,首先考虑质量型选择性分销协议是否属于《欧盟运行条约》第101条第1款的范围,因此需判断协议的目的或效果是否影响竞争。若协议为该款所规制的对象,那么就要以Metro标准评估选择性分销造成的品牌内竞争减弱是否能被品牌间质量竞争产生的积极效果所抵消。可是Metro标准固然为质量型选择性分销协议提供了合法性认定标准,但是在实际判定过程中存在模糊性,尤其是对合理规则进行具体解释的时候,许多现实问题有待解决。Vertical restriction is a controversial area in European competition law in recent years, and this paper explores the criteria for determining the legality of qualitative selective distribution agreements in vertical restrictions. Under the EU’s vertical restrictive regulatory framework, the first consideration is whether a qualitative selective distribution agreement falls within the scope of Article 101 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, so it is necessary to determine whether the purpose or effect of the agreement affects competition. If the agreement is the object of this paragraph, then the Metro criteria should be used to assess whether the reduction in intra-brand competition caused by selective distribution can be offset by the positive effect of quality competition between brands. However, although the Metro standard provides a legal determination standard for qualitative selective distribution agreements, there is ambiguity in the actual process, especially when the appropriate rules are specifically interpreted, and many practical problems need to be solved.

关 键 词：选择性分销 网上销售 品牌形象 Metro标准 合理规则 

分 类 号：D92[政治法律—法学]