零售商行为偏好下双渠道绿色供应链博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Dual Channel Green Supply Chain under Retailer Behavior Preferences

作　　者：张翔 魏锋[1] 薛业涵宇 黄好平 李源[1] 郭胜浩 

机构地区：[1]广西科技大学经济与管理学院,广西 柳州

出　　处：《可持续发展》2024年第1期171-179,共9页Sustainable Development

摘　　要：中共党的二十大报告中强调推动绿色发展和提升供应链韧性的重要性,为研究行为偏好对双渠道绿色供应链的韧性影响问题,本文以绿色供应商和零售商构成的双渠道绿色供应链为研究对象,通过构建Stackelberg博弈模型,探究零售商公平关切和损失规避双重行为偏好对供应链成员决策的影响,并通过算例对理论分析进行验证。研究表明,随着零售商的公平关切行为程度的增加,供应商和零售商的售价变化趋势相反,随着零售商的损失规避行为程度的增加,产品绿色水平及售价都会提高;零售商的双重行为偏好会对产品绿色水平的提高起到积极作用;绿色消费市场总需求增大会促进产品绿色水平的提高。In the report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the importance of promoting green development and enhancing supply chain resilience was emphasized. To study the impact of behavioral preferences on the resilience of dual channel green supply chains, this article takes a dual channel green supply chain composed of green suppliers and retailers as the research object. By constructing a Stackelberg game model, the article explores the impact of dual behavioral preferences of retailers, including fairness concerns and loss avoidance, on the decision-making of supply chain members, and verifies the theoretical analysis through numerical examples. Research has shown that as the degree of fairness concern behavior among retailers increases, the trend of price changes between suppliers and retailers is opposite. As the degree of loss avoidance behavior among retailers increases, the green level and price of products will both increase;the dual behavioral preferences of retailers will have a positive effect on improving the green level of products;the increase in total demand in the green consumer market will promote the improvement of the green level of products.

关 键 词：双渠道绿色供应链 零售商 公平关切 损失规避 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]