中国出口企业反倾销应诉行为分析——基于可达成协议的Cournot模型  

The Analysis of Chinese Exporting Enterprises’ Response to Foreign Anti-Dumping Litigation—Based on the Cournot Competition Model with Agreement

作　　者：石碧涛 

机构地区：[1]东莞理工学院经济与管理学院,广东 东莞

出　　处：《世界经济探索》2020年第1期6-14,共9页World Economic Research

基　　金：广东省高等教育教改项目“基于成果导向教育理念的国际经济与贸易专业人才培养模式研究”(GB100101-20)、东莞理工学院教育教改项目“国际化人才培养模式创新实验区”(201802008)。

摘　　要：中国出口企业的应诉不积极或不应诉的问题由来已久。本文通过建立Cournot同质产品竞争模型,分析在达成协议条件下企业的产量决定与应诉行为选择。在分析企业是否应诉的过程中,引入了期望收益、费用以及期望利润,考察四种不同情况下(不应诉不协商、应诉不协商、不应诉协商以及应诉协商)企业的支付状况,并且结合中国企业的实际情况给出了中国企业应诉与不应诉的期望收益。若以中国为例,出口企业应诉带来的收益要高于不应诉时的收益。The problem of Chinese exporting enterprises’ negative or no response to the litigation has been there for a long time. This paper examines the quantity choices and prosecuted enterprises’ responding behavior choices by setting up a Cournot homogenous product competition model under the circumstance: the probability of comprising exists. Expected revenue, costs and expected profits are introduced to analyze the firms’ decision of whether to participate in the responding process. The firms’ pay-offs are examined under four kinds of circumstance (no responding and no compromise, responding but no compromise, no responding but compromise, responding and compromise). The expected revenues of responding and no responding are calculated by combining the Chinese enterprises. Taking China for example, the expected profit of responding is higher than that of no responding.

关 键 词：反倾销 博弈 COURNOT竞争 应诉 

分 类 号：F75[经济管理—国际贸易]