真理紧缩论与真理的规范性地位  

The Deflationary Theory of Truth and the Truth-norm

作　　者：李主斌[1] LI Zhu-bin(School of Marxism,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200240,China)

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学马克思主义学院,上海200240

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2020年第2期23-29,共7页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：上海交通大学青年人才科研能力培育专项项目(16X100040008);国家社科基金重大项目(15ZDB013).

摘　　要：长久以来,真理被认为是信念(断定)的规范。真理紧缩论由于认为真理概念仅仅是认可断定的装置,因而否认这一点。对于紧缩主义的立场,赖特提出了一个二难论证,认为紧缩主义本身是不一致的。要辩护紧缩主义,就不得不回应这一二难论证。但是,通过详细梳理紧缩主义者可能提出的回应方案,本文尝试论证,霍维奇保守的方案不是回应而是奖赏了赖特,而更激进的方案则面临严重的困难。Truth has long been regarded as the norm of belief(assertion).The deflationary theory of truth denies this because it believes that the concept of truth is only a device for endorsing assertions.Regarding the deflationist’s such position,Crispin Wright proposed a dilemma argument and tried to demonstrate that deflationism itself is inconsistent.To defend deflationism,one has to respond to this dilemma.However,by scrutinizing the possible responses of deflationist,this article attempts to argue that Paul Horwich’s conservative approach is not a response but a reward for Wright,while a more radical solution faces serious difficulties.

关 键 词：真理 规范性 确保可断定性 紧缩主义 

分 类 号：B023.3[哲学宗教—哲学理论]