制造商质量投入竞争与合作的双渠道供应链动态博弈研究  

Dynamic Game Research on Dual-channel Supply Chain of Manufacturers’ Quality Input Competition and Cooperation

作　　者：王玖河[1,2] 张宁宁[1] 赵慧 WANG Jiu-he;ZHANG Ning-ning;ZHAO Hui(School of Economics and Management,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao 066004,China;Yanshan University Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Collaborative Development Management Innovation Research Center,Qinhuangdao 066004,China)

机构地区：[1]燕山大学经济管理学院,河北秦皇岛066004 [2]燕山大学京津冀协同发展管理创新研究中心,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2020年第3期27-36,共10页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：2018年河北省社科基金(HB18GL075).

摘　　要：针对具有不同质量投入和服务投入的双渠道供应链,主要研究其成员最优均衡决策问题.构建了包含两个制造商和一个零售商的两级双渠道供应链决策模型;采用微分博弈确定在制造商竞争和合作两种模型下各成员的最优均衡决策及其利润,并着重探讨质量投入系数、服务竞争系数和传统渠道市场占有率这三个关键参数对它们的影响;用算例对该模型进行仿真分析研究结果表明:在竞争模型下零售商的利润随着传统渠道市场占有率、质量投入竞争和服务竞争的增大而增大,但合作模型下的利润与服务竞争无关;制造商合作时制造商的利润之和提高,且两个制造商在两个渠道边际利润和之比在一定范围内,两个制造商会有合作意愿,但零售商的利润下降.研究能够为各成员企业的最优均衡决策提供支持和参考.For the dual-channel supply chain with different quality inputs and service inputs,the author mainly studies the optimal equilibrium decision-making problem of its members.A two-level dual-channel supply chain decision-making model consisting of two manufacturers and one retailer was constructed.The differential game was used to determine the optimal equilibrium decision and profit of each member under the two models of manufacturer competition and cooperation,and the quality was emphasized.The impact of the three key parameters of input coefficient,service competition coefficient and traditional channel market share on them;simulation analysis of the model using examples.The results show that the retailer’s profit increases with the traditional channel market share,quality investment competition and service competition under the competition model,but the profit under the cooperation model has nothing to do with service competition;the manufacturer cooperates with the manufacturer.The sum of the profits has increased,and the ratio of the profit margins of the two manufacturers in the two channels is within a certain range.The two manufacturers will have a willingness to cooperate,but the profits of the retailers will fall.The research can provide support and reference for the optimal equilibrium decision of each member company.

关 键 词：制造商竞争与合作 质量投入 微分博弈 双渠道供应链 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]