伦理世界中致知与力行的合一——道德的能力之知或动力之知争论的王船山方案  

The Unity of Perfected Knowledge and Devoted Practice in the Ethical World:Wang Chuanshan’s Solution of the Debate between Moral Knowing-how and Knowing-to

作　　者：杨超逸 Yang Chaoyi

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学哲学系

出　　处：《思想与文化》2022年第1期364-385,共22页Thought & Culture

摘　　要：关于王阳明的良知是道德的能力之知还是动力之知的争论,实质是知行合一说与知行本一说的差异。差异的核心在于,是否承认至少存在一种道德规范可以直接转化为道德行动。承认与否取决于如何解释人们的道德经验。王船山对王阳明的批判表明,解释道德经验需要以能够通达伦理世界为前提,以阳明学为基础的两种知行观都因为忽视了伦理世界而局限在个体范围内。只有通过力行,人们才能够参与到伦理世界的具体事务中,所以船山的伦理世界实在论方案主张行先知后。个体的德性扎根于伦理世界,并为具体行动提供动力。在此基础上可以重置两种知识:道德的能力之知强调德性涵养的过程,动力之知保证自觉涵养德性的意愿。两种知识都在个体与伦理世界的互动中完成。The core of the debate on whether the concept of liangzhi(良知)is moral knowing-how or knowing-to lies in whether there is at least one moral principle that can be directly transformed into moral action.Wang Chuanshan’s criticism of Yangming shows that the two views of knowledge and action based on liangzhi theory are limited within the bound of individuality.The premise of the interpretation of moral experience is the accessibility of the ethical world.Only through devoted practice can people participate in the ethical world and develop the virtue that provides motivation.On this basis,the two kinds of knowledge can be reset:moral knowing-how emphasizes the process of virtue cultivation,and knowing-to guarantees the willingness to participate in the ethical world consciously.

关 键 词：王船山 实在论 道德的能力之知 动力之知 

分 类 号：B82-0[哲学宗教—伦理学]