物理主义与心灵主义  

Physicalism,Psychism,and Phenomenalism

作　　者：钟磊[1] 曾璐(译) ZHONG Lei;ZENG Lu(Department of Philosophy,The Chinese University of Hong Kong;King's College London)

机构地区：[1]香港中文大学哲学系 [2]伦敦国王学院

出　　处：《清华西方哲学研究》2020年第2期-,共23页Tsinghua Studies in Western Philosophy

摘　　要：定义物理存在物的主流进路是诉诸理想物理学(与当下物理学相对)。然而,有人担心根据理想物理学来理解的物理主义会太宽松,不能排除"心灵主义",这种观点认为,心灵性在基本的形而上学层次存在。在本文中,我将论证,虽然物理主义与一些心灵主义的情况不相容,比如"现象主义"的情况,在这种情况中,理想物理学采用心灵概念来指称基本存在物;但物理主义应该容纳一种特定的心灵主义的情况,在这种情况中,在理想物理学中,基本的心灵存在物被非心灵概念指称。在此过程中,我提出对物理存在物的一种独特的解释,基于以下两种可信的论点:1)物理存在物是被物理概念指称的存在物;2)物理概念是理想物理学中非心灵的自然概念。如此理解的物理主义将既不会太宽松,也不会太苛刻。The dominant way to define physical entities is by appeal to ideal physics(as opposed to current physics).However,it has been worried that physicalism understood in terms of ideal physics would be too liberal to rule out"psychism",which is the view that mentality exists at the fundamental metaphysical level.In this article,I argue that whereas physicalism is incompatible with some psychist cases,such as the case of"phenomenalism"in which ideal physics adopts mental concepts to denote fundamental entities,physicalism should accommodate a certain type of psychist case in which fundamental mental entities are denoted by non-mental concepts in ideal physics.In so doing,I propose a distinctive account of physical entities,which is based on two plausible theses:1)physical entities are entities denoted by physical concepts;and 2)physical concepts are non-mental natural concepts in ideal physics.Physicalism thus understood is expected to be neither too liberal nor too demanding.

关 键 词：物理主义 现象主义 心灵主义 物理学 形而上学 自然概念 指称 存在物 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]