共同机构投资者能够提高盈余信息质量吗  

Does Common Institutional Ownership Improve the Quality of Earnings Information?

作　　者：吴晓晖[1] 李玉敏 柯艳蓉 Wu Xiaohui

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,361005 [2]闽南师范大学商学院,363000

出　　处：《会计研究》2022年第6期56-74,共19页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71572167)的资助

摘　　要：在机构投资者行业内多样化投资日益普遍的背景下,本文探究共同机构投资者对投资组合公司盈余信息质量的影响。研究发现,共同机构投资者能够带来“合谋效应”,引导投资组合公司利用应计盈余管理隐藏合谋收益以降低潜在的政治成本与监察风险。进一步地,投资组合公司还会操纵真实盈余管理中的生产成本,“合理化”合谋导致的产品价格上涨。此外,研究还发现,隐藏超额利润是共同机构投资者要求投资组合公司进行盈余管理的主要动因;高市场化水平、非国有产权性质提高了共同机构投资者的合谋动机与能力,致使投资组合公司的负向盈余管理更加严重,而高行政监管水平带来的合谋曝光风险则能够抑制该现象;投资组合公司的负向盈余管理导致行业竞争环境恶化,不利于维持公平的行业竞争秩序。As institutional investors increasingly diversify their investments in the industry,this paper explores the impact of common institutional ownership on the earnings information quality of portfolio firms.It is found that common institutional ownership can bring about the“collusion effect”,guiding portfolio firms to use accrued earnings management to reduce the potential political cost and supervision risk.Further,portfolio firms also manipulate the costs of production in real earnings management to“rationalize”the product price increases caused by collusion.In addition,the study also found that the main motivation of earnings management is to hide the excess profits.The high level of marketization and the nature of non-state-owned property rights improve the collusion motivation and ability of common institutional ownership,resulting in more serious downward earnings management of portfolio firms,while the risk of collusion exposure brought by the high level of administrative supervision can inhibit this phenomenon.The downward earnings management of portfolio firms leads to the deterioration of industry competition environment,which is not conducive to maintaining the fair order of industry competition.

关 键 词：共同机构投资者 政治成本 负向盈余管理 行业竞争环境 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]