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作 者:吴武清[1] 赵越[1] 田雅婧 苏子豪 Wu Wuqing
机构地区:[1]中国人民大学商学院,100872 [2]哈尔滨工业大学经济与管理学院,150001
出 处:《会计研究》2020年第8期18-37,共20页Accounting Research
基 金:国家自然科学基金面上项目(71871216);北京市社会科学基金项目(17GLB022);中国人民大学科学研究基金项目(16XNB025)资助
摘 要:客观评价政府研发补助的政策实施效果,对推动实现国家创新战略具有重要意义。本文以2007年至2016年我国A股上市公司为样本,重新构建研发投入指标,采用分位数回归方法对研发补助的实施效果进行再讨论。研究发现:(1)随着自主研发投入水平的提高,研发补助的边际效应先表现为不断减弱的挤出效应,再逆转体现为不断增强的挤入效应;(2)企业内在创新动力与外部政治压力是研发补助逆转效应形成的可能路径。理论分析和一系列稳健检验均表明研发补助的挤入效应和挤出效应是同时存在的,研发补助的作用在不同自主研发投入水平上存在显著异质性。本文最后从研发补助资金监管、识别高创新动能企业、制定合理激励制度三方面提出政策建议。This study examines the effect of government R&D subsidies and illustrates how it promotes corporate innovation in China.We use a novel indicator for R&D investment and employ the quantile regression approach to test the effect of R&D subsidies.Based on a sample of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2016,we find that with the increase of self-financed R&D investments,a crowding-out effect occurs,gradually weakens and reverses to an increasing crowding-in effect.We further show that the internal innovative motivation and external political pressure make important contributions to this change within firms.Our results are similar after conducting a series of robustness tests,suggesting that the crowding-in and crowding-out effects of R&D subsidies exist simultaneously yet vary depending on the level of self-financed R&D investments.Our findings provide political implications for government on the supervision of R&D subsidies,evaluation of corporate innovation potential,and utilization of innovation mechanisms.
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