定向增发、大股东控制权与企业创新研究  

Private Placement, Control of Major Shareholders and Innovation of Enterprises

作　　者：郑毅 夏俊梅 ZHENG Yi;XIA Junmei(School of Accounting and Finance,BeiJing Institute of Technology,ZhuHai 519088;School of Business Administration,LiaoNing Technical University,HuLuDao 125105)

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学珠海学院会计与金融学院,珠海519088 [2]辽宁工程技术大学工商管理学院,葫芦岛125105

出　　处：《科技促进发展》2020年第9期1070-1077,共8页Science & Technology for Development

基　　金：2018年辽宁省教育厅经济社会发展研究课题一般项目(2018lslktyb-069):新一轮东北振兴背景下辽宁装备制造业竞争力发展研究,负责人:郑毅;2018年葫芦岛市哲学社会科学研究课题重点项目(HLDSKY20180016):董事会治理、经理控制与新创公司创新绩效,负责人:郑毅

摘　　要：融资问题是企业创新面临的重要障碍,而代理问题是制约创新的重要原因。本文以我国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证分析了定向增发、大股东控制权与企业创新之间的关系。结论显示:定向增发对企业创新投入具有显著的促进作用;大股东参与定向增发后的持股比例不同,对于研发投入决策的影响不同。本文首次从资金流转的视角研究企业创新面临的融资约束和代理问题,丰富了融资与企业创新的研究成果,同时,本文的研究结论对于上市公司有效运用定向增发融资决策和加强融资过程监管都具有借鉴意义。Financing problem is an important obstacle to enterprise innovation,and agency problem is an important reason to restrict innovation.This paper takes A-share listed companies in China as the research sample,and empirically analyzes the relationship between directional additional issuance,large shareholder control and enterprise innovation.The conclusion shows that:directional placement has a significant effect on enterprise innovation investment;large shareholders participate in the proportion of shares after directional placement,the impact on R&D investment decision is different.This paper first studies the financing constraints and agency problems of enterprise innovation from the perspective of capital circulation,which enriches the research results of financing and enterprise innovation.The effect is of reference to the decision-making and the strengthening of the supervision of the financing process.

关 键 词：定向增发 大股东控制权 企业创新 股权再融资 代理问题 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F273.1[经济管理—国民经济]