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作 者:汪琳 刘旭阳 欧博 何成铭 WANG Lin;LIU Xuyang;OU Bo;HE Chengming(Army Armored Forces Academy,Beijing 100072,China)
机构地区:[1]陆军装甲兵学院,北京100072
出 处:《军事交通学报》2022年第8期33-38,共6页Journal of Military Transportation University
摘 要:为提高器材储备效益,保障陆军战储车辆器材数量能够满足作战需求,在当前军队与企业双方储备信息不对称条件下,基于双边委托代理理论研究器材“以厂代储”的激励机制设计问题。设计固定管理费联合奖惩激励的费用给付机制,以合理的激励系数诱使企业选择军队期望的努力水平来执行器材代储工作。建模分析与求解结果表明:该激励机制能够实现军-企双方军事效益与经济效益的双赢。To improve the efficiency of equipment storage and ensure that the army storage vehicles equipment can meet the operational demand,this paper studies the incentive mechanism design of"replacing storage with factory"with the bilateral principal-agent theory under the current condition of asymmetric reserve information between army and enterprises.It firstly designs the cost payment mechanism of fixed management fee combined with reward and punishment incentives,and uses a reasonable incentive coefficient to induce enterprises to choose the desired effort level of the army to implement the equipment storage work.Then,through modeling analysis and solution,it obtains the results that the incentive mechanism can achieve a win-win situation of military and economic benefits for both military and enterprise.
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