基于契约经济学的公司激励契约的完备性分析  

Completeness Degree Analysis of Incentive Contract Based on the Contract Economics

作　　者：王可瑜[1] 王平心[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710061

出　　处：《经济问题》2008年第1期27-30,共4页On Economic Problems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70671058)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：委托-代理理论对于建立完备契约,防治机会主义行为具有重要意义。通过比较分析三种参数化的委托-代理模型得出如下结论:在当前制度和市场环境下,委托人若以企业的净资产现金利润率为基础评价代理人的经营业绩,并以适当的标准强制发放现金股利,则代理契约的完备程度将增加,控股股东掠夺小股东和职业经理侵害外部股东利益等代理问题也将得到有效解决。Principal-agent theory takes on important meaning for constituting complete contract and preventing the action of opportunism.authors compared and analyzed three parameter principal-agent model and draw a conclusion that,Under the current institutional and market condition,The principal appraise agency's management outstanding achievement based on cash return of net asset and compare with proper standard,so the completeness degree of agency contract will increase,the agency problem of Controlling shareholde...

关 键 词：委托-代理 法律环境 契约的完备程度 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]