基于数量折扣策略的两级供应链协调的博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of A Two-echelon Supply Chain Coordination Based on Quantity Discount

作　　者：王能民[1] 程石磊[1] 冯耕中[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院

出　　处：《复旦学报（自然科学版）》2007年第4期517-522,共6页Journal of Fudan University：Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70602017);国家社科基金资助项目(06CJY019)

摘　　要：以在决策周期内定购总次数必须为整数这一客观条件为前提,研究了随机需求下合作博弈和非合作博弈时两级供应链的协调策略.相对于新的前提条件,用新的求解方法求出了非合作博弈的斯塔克博格均衡解和合作博弈的帕累托最优解,给出了由于合作带来的额外利润的分配策略,并用模拟算例验证了分析结果.Considering the ordering times in decision cycle should be an integer,it studies on how to coordinate a two-echelon supply chain in cooperative and non-cooperative games under random demand,and gives a new way to solve the coming problems based on the new preconditions.For the non-cooperative case,the Stackelberg equilibrium is derived;for the cooperative case,the Pareto Optimality criteria is used to find a group of optimal strategies,and a method to divide the increased profits is also designed.Finally,th...

关 键 词：数量折扣 博弈 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]