上市公司内部治理机制对关联交易影响的实证分析  

Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Listed Companies' Inside Governance Mechanism on Related-party Transaction

作　　者：陈旭东[1] 王锦华[1] 

机构地区：[1]石河子大学经济贸易学院,新疆石河子832003

出　　处：《财会通讯（学术版）》2007年第11期56-58,共3页Communication of Finance and Accounting

摘　　要：本文从公司内部治理角度对我国上市公司关联交易进行研究后发现,股权结构对关联交易行为有很大影响;我国独立董事制度的建立,在一定程度上有效约束和减少了关联交易;董事长与总经理两职合一更促进了关联交易行为的发生;监事对关联交易行为的监督机制还没有充分发挥;管理层没有通过频繁的关联交易来提升公司业绩,债权人还未能积极参与到公司治理中,也就不可能有效抑制非公允关联交易行为的发生。This thesis has carried out analysis on related-party transactions in Chinese listed company from inside governance. The research results show: Share equity structure influences related-party transactions strongly; Independent directorate system can effectively restrain and reduce the emergence; chairman and general manager are two duty-in-one, the related-party transactions easily happen; and the supervision mechanism of supervisor board has certain effect ,but its effect is not notable ;at the same time, ...

关 键 词：内部治理 关联交易 实证研究 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]