经营者投资组合管理下的长期激励问题研究  

Research on the Long-Term Incentive Mechanism under Executive's Management of Combined Investment

作　　者：吴崇[1] 胡汉辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,南京210096

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2007年第6期125-131,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70473013)

摘　　要：持续发展企业的投资分为战略投资和经营投资两类,前者侧重于长期绩效导向的企业战略机会的开发,后者着眼于近期利润获取的企业资源的开采。基于经营者可观测产出的传统激励机制,弱化了经营者短期难以证实的战略投资管理的激励,导致激励的短期效应。因而,利用实物期权方法特有的战略机会的评价能力,对上述经营者多任务激励机制进行了优化。研究表明:基于企业战略机会评价的长期激励机制,有助于发挥所有者的激励导向作用,促成企业战略和激励的协同,引导经营者在战略和经营投资管理间取得适应性平衡;两类投资管理的相关性,会对经营者激励机制设计产生影响,进而决定企业在两类投资组合管理上的合理配置。The investment of developing enterprises is divided into strategic investment and operating investment,the former emphasizes on the long-term performance from exploration of enterprise's strategic chance,the latter cares about the current profit's gain from exploitation of enterprise resources.The traditional incentive mechanism based on the executive's confirmable output weakened the incentive of executive's strategic investment management,resulted in short-term effect in incentive.So,real options method was used to optimize the above multi-task incentive mechanism.The result suggests that the long-term incentive mechanism based on the judge of strategic chances contributes to the effect of owner's incentive guide,facilitates the executive to make managerial balance between strategic project and operating project.The relativity of two kinds of investment management will exert influences on the design of executive's incentive mechanism,and then determine the proper collocation of two kinds of investment projects' combined management in enterprises.

关 键 词：多任务代理 激励机制 战略投资 经营投资 实物期权 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]