国有上市公司投资者保护:基于控制权私有收益的检验  

Investor Benefit Protection of State-owned Listed Companies: Evidence from Private Benefits of Corporate Control

作　　者：邹晖[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学工商管理学院,成都610064

出　　处：《经济问题》2008年第4期109-111,共3页On Economic Problems

基　　金：教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划基金项目(NCET-04-0883)

摘　　要：目前的研究对国有上市公司在投资者保护方面的效果褒贬不一。从控制权私有收益理论出发,以1997~2006年10间发生控制权转移事件的公司为样本,对国有上市公司中国有股权与控制权私有收益之间的关系进行了分析。研究发现了国有股东在投资者利益保护方面的双重作用:总体而言,国有股东相对于非国有股东能够提供更好的投资者利益保护,但在相对控股的范围内,更高的持股比例将导致投资者利益保护更差。The existing research hasn t drawn the same conclusion about the effect of state-owned listed companies in investor benefit protection.Based on the theory of private benefits of corporate control,this paper samples the companies that has transferred its control from 1997 to 2006,tests the relationship between government shares and private benefits of corporate control and explores that the government shareholders is better at investor benefit protection than others,while in the range of relative control,the...

关 键 词：国有股东 控制权私有收益 控制权转移 投资者利益保护 

分 类 号：F83[经济管理—金融学]