保险公司与医院合作的博弈分析  

The Analysis of Game Between Insurance Company and Hospital

作　　者：钟胜[1] 罗琳[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学工商管理学院,四川成都610064

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2004年第3期90-94,共5页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70103007)

摘　　要：本文在委托—代理理论的框架下构建了在医疗保险风险控制过程中保险公司与医院的委托—代理模型,分析了这种合作的可行性;并运用无限期重复博弈模型探讨了合作的稳定性,同时引证国外管理医疗模式下的POS组织的实例,揭示了保险公司与医院之间应该建立"利益共享,风险共担"的有效的激励机制。This paper sets up a cooperated principal-agent between the insurance company and the hospital (during) the medical insurance risk controlling process and analyzes its feasibility. The infinite repeated games are used to analyze its stability. At the same time an example of POS organization from the foreign medical management model is cited to reveal that the system should be set up between the both parties to share both profit and risk.

关 键 词：健康经济学 风险控制 博弈论 医疗保险 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]