维特根斯坦与逻辑经验主义  

Wittgenstein and logical empiricism

作　　者：俞胜[1] 洪晓楠[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学人文社会科学学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2003年第4期72-76,共5页Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：辽宁省社会科学基金项目<科学文化哲学研究>(2002-03-12)

摘　　要：《逻辑哲学论》的目的是为了分清可说的和不可说的界限。不可说的东西不是由证实原则决定的,也不是由逻辑形式的界限决定的,而是由于我们语言的界限,我们无法表达它,对此只好沉默;《逻辑哲学论》对逻辑经验主义的影响主要有两个方面,其一是逻辑经验主义者的哲学倾向与维特根斯坦十分近似,其二是逻辑经验主义者曲解维特根斯坦的思想,引为己用。The aim of 'Tractatus Logico-philosophicus' is to distinguish 'talkable' from 'untalkable'. 'Untalkable' thing is not decided by the proving principle and the logical situation, but decided by language bounds. We couldn't express it any way. So we have to keep silence to it. There are two kinds of influences of 'Tractatus Logico-philosophicus' on logical empiricism: One is that the philosophical trend of the logical experimentalists is similiar to Wittgenstein's; the other is to distort Wittgenstein's thoughts and cite them for their own use.

关 键 词：维特根斯坦 逻辑经验主义 重言式 

分 类 号：B08[哲学宗教—哲学理论]