企业盈余管理动机与治理的理论分析  

A Theoretical Analysis on the Motivation and Governance of Surplus Management

作　　者：许波[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学会计学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2003年第5期70-74,共5页Modern Economic Science

摘　　要：盈余管理在一定程度上对会计信息的可靠性产生影响 ,进而影响到相关利益人的决策。本文对盈余管理的概念进行了重新界定 ,认为只有分析盈余管理产生的动机才能有效治理盈余管理。通过划分私人利益和组织目标两个层面 ,对盈余管理的动机进行理论剖析并揭示其主要方式 。Surplus management has effect on the reliability of accounting information to certain extent, and then on the decision-making of the party interested. This paper redefines the concept of surplus management, deeming that only if the motivation of surplus management is analyzed can the management be governed effectively. By differentiating private interests from corporation objectives the paper makes a theoretical analysis on motivation of surplus management and reveals its principal mode. Finally the paper brings forward policy suggestions to govern surplus management effectively.

关 键 词：盈余管理 动机 治理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]