排污权交易条件下有效控制厂商违规排污行为的机制  

On Research of Effective Supervision Emission Firm's Violation

作　　者：李芳[1] 黄桐城[2] 顾孟迪[2] 

机构地区：[1]云南财经大学工商管理学院,昆明650221 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2006年第6期495-498,502,共5页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70573073;70273021)

摘　　要：研究了排污权交易条件下,有效控制厂商违规排污行为的机制问题。结果表明:环保部门只有提高控制的时效性,才能有效控制更看中当前利益厂商的违规排污行为;环保部门的最优事后控制是将厂商的违规排污行为控制在一定范围之内的控制;环保部门实施控制的过程中存在额外成本,并且实施有效控制的要素存在优先顺序。Through solving a two-stage dynamic game,the paper shows that the government's ex-post supervision should aim to control the of emission firm to an appropriate level rather than completely eliminating it.The ordinary ex-post supervision system fails for those violators with high discount rate.The only effective method to this kind violation is to shorten the time lag.An effective supervision System should consider the difference among executors first,then pay attention to their sensitivities to the penalty,and lastly determine the optimal supervision level.

关 键 词：排污厂商 控制机制 排污权交易 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]